JOURNAL OF MEDICINE AND PHILOSOPHY医学与哲学杂志
JOURNAL OF MEDICINE AND PHILOSOPHY(英文缩写 J MED PHILOS),ISSN 0360-5310,eISSN 1744-5019,中文译名:医学与哲学杂志 是一本学术期刊。本页汇总该期刊的最新影响因子、分区信息以及最新收录于 PubMed 的文献,帮助您快速了解期刊全貌。
发文量统计区间：2025-09-27 至 2026-09-27，按本站收录文献的发表日期统计。
期刊介绍
历年影响因子趋势
| JCR 数据年份 | 影响因子 | JCR 分区 |
|---|---|---|
| 2021 | 1.493 | Q3 |
| 2022 | 1.600 | Q3 |
| 2023 | 1.300 | Q3 |
| 2024 | 1.900 | Q2 |
| 2025 | 2.000 | Q2 |
JOURNAL OF MEDICINE AND PHILOSOPHY 最新收录文献
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1. "No" to Human Enhancement? An Assessment from Two Kinds of Daoism.
PMID:日期:2026-10-01Both advocates and critics of human enhancement technology today agree that it will change fundamental parameters of human existence. This paper explores the ethical dimension of human enhancement from the perspective of Daoism (Daoism is an umbrella under which we have daojia (The lineage of the Dao, or philosophical Daoism) and daojiao (the teachings on the Dao or Daoist religion). In this paper, the discussion is focused on philosophical Daoism represented by Laozi and Zhuangzi in the Pre-Han period and religious Daoism after the Han period to explicate their different views toward technology and human enhancement. English translations of the Daodejing are my own. English quotations from the Zhuangzi text are from Burton Walston's translation.). I contend that Daoist tradition is multifaceted and heterogeneous, encompassing several different outlooks and positions, and thus its views on technology in general and genetic enhancement in particular are much more complicated than a simple answer of yes or no. My discussion focuses on two kinds of Daoism in ancient China; namely, philosophical Daoism represented by Zhuangzi and religious Daoism developed in the later Han period (the firstt-second centuries CE). The paper offers two different accounts of Daoist positions on human enhancement and then discusses their ethical implications.
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2. An Aristotelian Approach to the Genetic Enhancement of Virtue.
PMID:日期:2026-10-01This article considers the question of the genetic enhancement of virtue from the standpoint of Aristotle's ethical theory. I argue that the direct genetic enhancement of Aristotelian virtue would not be possible, since virtue requires habituation. Nevertheless, Aristotle's view of the physiological preconditions for acquiring virtue entails that we could genetically enhance our receptivity for successful habituation into virtue. I caution against one danger for such attempts, which I call "the bigger they are the harder they fall" problem. I argue that Aristotle's emphasis on the indispensability of habituation for the acquisition of virtue means that genetic enhancement could be useful only within the context of a society of virtuous people who can already successfully bring up children into virtue. It is therefore unlikely to serve as a panacea for our woes if we begin with the premise that our society is in a crisis with respect to virtue.
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3. Human Enhancement: A Conceptual Scoping Review.
PMID:日期:2026-10-01Moral bioenhancement refers to the use of biological or technological interventions to make a moral agent better as a moral agent. The literature often fails to acknowledge critical underlying assumptions and differences in how the term is understood and applied. This scoping review of the moral bioenhancement literature offers a conceptual geography of terms, definitions, and ethical considerations raised in the literature to advance analysis and discussion. It reveals ambiguities that are central to but not always addressed in the literature. Eight key areas are identified, and an overview of the relevant differences in each area is provided: definitions, types of interventions, targets of enhancement, reasons identified for pursuing moral enhancement, objections to or concerns with moral enhancement, the conditions under which moral enhancement is permissible or obligatory, whether and how authors invoke character and virtue, and whether and what role the concepts of transhumanism or post-personhood play.
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4. Neurobiological Determinism versus Human Freedom: Competing Explanatory Models and the Hope for Moral Enhancement.
PMID:日期:2026-10-01The "neuromoral" medical explanatory model of antisocial or inadequately prosocial behavior posits a biological cause for what advocates judge to be immoral activity. Proponents of this model hold that immoral behavior is the result of a dysfunction in a network of neural circuits primarily located in the frontal lobes, believed to be the "neurobiological seat" of ethical choice. Advocates encourage medical treatments, such as transcranial direct current stimulation of the prefrontal cortex, to correct brain functional impairments that presumably cause aggressive, risk-affirming, antisocial, or non-empathetic behavior. Assuming therapy successfully modifies patient behavior toward higher levels of empathy and prosocial activity, while reducing risky or aggressive behavior, such an outcome, given these background assumptions, would constitute medical treatment for immoral behavior-plausibly, a form of "moral enhancement." As I argue, however, neurobiological claims to have found the source of moral decision-making are ambiguous and unjustified or, at least, overstated. Consequently, assertions regarding neurological treatment as moral enhancement should be approached with skepticism.
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5. Ethical Examination of Genetic Enhancement from the Perspective of Confucian Human Dignity.
PMID:日期:2026-10-01With rapid advances in gene editing technology, the ethics of genetic enhancement has emerged as a prominent issue attracting scholarly attention. Many scholars express concern that genetic enhancement facilitated by gene editing may infringe on human dignity. Bioethicists remain divided on whether genetic enhancement violates human dignity and how effectively to safeguard it during the application of this technology. Confucian ethics offers a profound exploration of human dignity and can serve as a critical lens for assessing whether genetic enhancement technology compromises human dignity. This article explores the ethical implications of human genetic enhancement by reinterpreting the dual dimensions of the Confucian concept of dignity and its associated moral requirements. The Confucian perspective on dignity provides a valuable and unique approach to addressing ethical challenges in genetic enhancement technology.
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6. Genetic Moral Enhancement-A View Based on Mencius' Theory of Human Nature.
PMID:日期:2026-10-01Genetic moral enhancement (GME) aims to morally improve a person by using genetic technology. This paper discusses what kinds of GMEs are morally acceptable (or unacceptable) based on Mencius' theory of human nature. First, I argue that one kind of GME aimed at improving empathic concern to be more inclined to help others can be defended by Mencius' view of the heart-mind of pity and compassion (ceyinzhixin, ). Second, I show that one kind of GMEs would be morally unacceptable for Mencius based on the Confucian view of love with distinction (aiyouchadeng, ). This approach to GME attempts to modify the biological mechanisms underlying empathy, enabling individuals to "feel and experience" others' pain or harm as if it were their own, thereby making them more inclined to help others.
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7. Clinical Ethics in Name Only? The Case for Moral Realism at the Bedside.
PMID:日期:2026-09-25As Clinical Ethics Consultation (CEC) becomes more institutionalized, concerns about its legitimacy and efficacy have grown. We defend a realist orientation, according to which CEC has normative force only if its recommendations answer to stance-independent reasons, not to individual preferences and institutional policies. Public justification can and should proceed through familiar means (e.g., shared mid-level norms and transparent procedures) so that stakeholders can scrutinize the reasoning. We show how neutrality, admirable as a procedural virtue, hollows CEC when treated as a master ideal, leaving hard cases to defaults and institutional inertia. In its place, we develop moral expertise as sustained, transparent reasoning that integrates the clinical picture with the profession's content-full standards. We then construe warranted deference as rational trust in contrastive reason-tracking rather than deference to role. Our comparative thesis holds that shared norms successfully handle routine cases, but persistent disagreement and institutional pressure call for a realist grounding that secures determinate, action-guiding recommendations. On such realist understanding, CEC remains normatively accountable and oriented toward getting things right.
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8. Choosing Death So That Others May Live: The Permissibility of Living Vital Organ Donation.
PMID:日期:2026-08-28The conventional admiration for supererogatory acts, where individuals sacrifice themselves to aid others, contrasts sharply with the hesitance observed when considering the living donation of vital organs. This article challenges this inconsistency, contending that no relevant moral difference exists between other celebrated supererogatory acts and the act of living vital organ donation. I go beyond the proposed concept of organ donation euthanasia, advocating for the moral permissibility of living vital organ donation, even though one is not facing imminent death from other causes.
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9. The Institutional Status of Medical and Psychiatric Diagnoses: The Consequences of the Speech Act of Diagnosis.
PMID:日期:2026-08-25Diagnosis, as the statement of the disease from which the patient suffers, is a central element in modern medicine. However, a diagnosis is more than just a statement about an illness aimed at guiding treatment. It is also a powerful speech act with important social and other consequences for its recipient, as several sociologists have observed. In this article, I discuss the nature of the speech act of diagnosis. I then draw on social ontology, in particular Searle's theory about how the social world is constructed, to show how a statement of diagnosis generates an institutional fact about the person diagnosed, and thus how it can have power over its recipient. Next I describe some of the consequences of this in the contexts of somatic medicine and psychiatry, noting the consequences it can have for people's lives beyond those caused by the illness itself.
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10. Predictors in the Clinic: Predicting Patient Choice and Preference.
PMID:日期:2026-08-20It has been proposed that technical systems that estimate patient choices and preferences should guide treatment when patients are incapacitated. However, the ethical debate about such Patient Preference Predictors needs conceptual clarity. We distinguish between choices and preferences, between types of preferences, and between preferences over treatments and preferences over how treatment decisions are made. These distinctions show that respect for autonomy can take several forms: respect for a person's explicit choices, for her overall preferences, or for her most central and enduring values. We argue that while Predictors may enhance beneficence, and reduce uncertainty and conflict, they raise normative questions about which preferences should be estimated and respected. In particular, we question the moral relevance of hypothetical choices, as well as the legitimacy of idealizing preferences beyond restored competence. Preferences over decision methods can be instrumental to treatment outcomes but can also be intrinsic. The latter may sometimes conflict with preferences regarding outcomes.